Hybrid logics are a principled generalization of both modal logics and description logics, a standard formalism for knowledge representation. In this paper we give the first constructive version of hybrid logic, thereby showing that it is possible to hybridize constructive modal logics. Alternative systems are discussed, but we fix on a reasonable and well-motivated version of intuitionistic hybrid logic and prove essential proof-theoretical results for a natural deduction formulation of it. Our natural deduction system is also extended with additional inference rules corresponding to conditions on the accessibility relations expressed by so-called geometric theories. Thus, we give natural deduction systems in a uniform way for a wide class of constructive hybrid logics. This shows that constructive hybrid logics are a viable enterprise and opens up the way for future applications.
Introduction
Classical hybrid logic is obtained by adding to ordinary classical modal logic further expressive power in the form of a second sort of propositional symbols called nominals, and moreover, by adding so-called satisfaction operators. A nominal is assumed to be true at exactly one world, so a nominal can be considered the name of a world. Thus, in hybrid logic a name is a particular sort of propositional symbol whereas in first-order logic it is an argument to a predicate. If a is a nominal and A is an arbitrary formula, then a new formula a : A called a satisfaction statement can be formed. The part a : of a : A is called a satisfaction operator. The satisfaction statement a : A expresses that the formula A is true at one particular world, namely the world at which the nominal a is true.
The present paper concerns constructive hybrid logics, that is, hybrid logics where the classical logic basis has been replaced by a constructive logic basis. A question we can ask is of course why should one worry about constructive hybrid logics.
A first, philosophical answer might be that since we "believe" in constructive logics as well as in hybrid logics, we would like to combine them in one logical system.
A second, more mathematical answer may be simply that we should be able to define "constructive hybrid logics" since we presume that the main concerns of hybrid logic are orthogonal to as whether the logic basis is constructive or not. We note that this supposition of orthogonality is justified by a distinction between the way of reasoning and what the reasoning is about. If we do define basic constructive hybrid logics and prove for them the kinds of results that we usually prove for constructive logics (normalization, subformula property, cut-elimination), we learn more about extant hybrid logics and we provide more evidence that hybrid logics are important in their own right 3 .
A third, pragmatic answer, or perhaps one geared to applications, is that if one needs to construct a logic of contexts with certain characteristics, perhaps a constructive basic hybrid logic might be the right foundation for this kind of application. The basic intuition here is that the satisfaction operators of hybrid logic might be just the syntactic tool required to construct logics that pay attention to contexts with certain desirable features. This hypothesis can only be checked, once we have defined and investigated one or more basic constructive hybrid logics, at least to some extent. Moreover, we reckon that a modal type theory based on hybrid logic could prove itself useful 4 , as other constructive modal type theories and as other classical hybrid logics have already proven themselves.
Of course, even if the supposition above, of orthogonality between hybridness and constructivity is valid, we still do not know exactly how to define constructive hybrid logics. We do not have a recipe for defining constructive hybrid logics: Several open possibilities are discussed, but we fix on a reasonable and well-motivated natural deduction system and prove some essential proof-theoretical results for this system. Moreover, we show how to extend the system with additional inference rules corresponding to first-order conditions on the accessibility relations. The conditions we consider are expressed by so-called geometric theories. Different geometric theories give rise to different constructive hybrid logics, so natural deduction systems for new constructive hybrid logics can be obtained in a uniform way simply by adding inference rules as appropriate.
One of the hallmarks of contemporary modal logic is the view that modal logics are languages for talking about relational structures, that is, models in the sense of model-theory. Thus, modal logics are alternatives to (classical) first-order logics. This view is well justified, but we believe that proof-theory adds another important perspective to modal logics, emphasizing the notion of proof and the fundamental differences between various formal systems for representing proofs, see [14] . The perspective of this paper is proof-theoretic, so we shall focus on formal proof systems for constructive hybrid logic. This paper is structured as follows. In the second section of the paper we make some preliminary considerations, in the third section we give a Kripke semantics, and in the fourth section we introduce a natural deduction system, and moreover, we prove a normalization theorem. The natural deduction system is an intuitionistic version of a natural deduction system for classical hybrid logic originally given in the paper [5] . In the fifth section we prove soundness and completeness with respect to Kripke semantics. In the final section we draw some conclusions and discuss future work. This paper is an extended version of [7] . While the previous version only discussed pure hybrid systems, the extended version here discusses additional inference rules corresponding to first-order conditions on the accessibility relations.
Preliminaries
Having decided to investigate constructive hybrid logics, we must describe, what their main components are. We start with a short description of constructive modal logic. This is followed by another short description of what constitutes classical hybrid logic. Finally we describe ways of putting these components together.
Constructive modal logic
'Constructive' is an umbrella term for logics that worry about deciding which disjunct is true and/or about providing witnesses for existential statements. Here we mean much more restrictively that we take our basis to be intuitionistic logic, henceforth IL for the propositional fragment and IFOL for intuitionistic first-order logic.
While the syntax (in axiomatic form) and the semantics (in usual Kripke style) of traditional, classical modal logics are relatively well-known, it is fair to say that even axioms for constructive modal logics, but especially natural deduction formalizations for these are subject to much debate.
We start by describing which basic axioms we require for a minimal K constructive modal logic. First we define our formulas. Given a basic set of propositional symbols ranged over by the metavariables p, q, r, . . . , the well-formed formulas of our constructive modal logic are built by conjunction, disjunction, and implication, together with falsum and the necessity and possibility modalities. Thus, the formulas are defined by the grammar
where p is a propositional symbol. In what follows, the metavariables A, B, C, . . . range over formulas. Negation, as usual in constructive logic, is defined by the convention that ¬A is an abbreviation for A → ⊥. Also, the nullary conjunction is an abbreviation for ¬⊥ and the bi-implication A ↔ B is an abbreviation for (A → B) ∧ (B → A).
Axioms for this system consist of any basic axiomatization of intuitionistic propositional logic (IL) together with Simpson's axioms for the modalitites. These are:
together with the proof rules of Necessitation (Nec) and Modus Ponens (MP )
We start by defining the possible-worlds semantics for the intuitionistic modal logic that we shall be using. We remark that this notion of a model for intuitionistic modal logic was originally introduced in a tense-logical version by Ewald in [8] and it has also been used by Simpson in [17] , p. 88. 
Definition 1 A model for basic intuitionistic modal logic is a tuple
Given a model M as defined above, the relation M, w, d |= A is defined by induction, where w is an element of W , d is an element of D w , and A is a formula. Simpson's natural deduction system consists of labelled versions of the usual rules for the propositional connectives plus the following rules for the modalities:
The rules (♦E) and ( I) are equipped with appropriate side-conditions in connection with the label y, that is, y does not occur in x : ♦A, in z : B, or in any undischarged assumptions other than the specified occurrences of y : A and xRy. Moreover, y does not occur in x : A or in any undischarged assumptions other than the specified occurrences of xRy. Simpson's natural deduction system is different from, say natural deduction in Prawitz's book, in two aspects: First it has all of its formulas labelled; they have the form x : A where x is a label, that is, a variable, and A is a formula. Intuitively, the variable x denotes a world in a modal model and the metalinguistic expression x : A is to be read as 'formula A holds at world x.' Secondly, Simpson's system has relational premises on the form xRy, and similarly, relational assumptions. The metalinguistic expression xRy is to be read as 'world x sees world y.'
There are several versions of natural deduction systems for (mostly classical) modal logics of this form in the literature [1, 12, 16, 9] . Their basic idea is always to give introduction and elimination rules for necessitiy ( ) and possibility (♦) which capture their possible worlds interpretation 5 . Recall that Simpson's particular version of natural deduction presentation satisfies normalization, as well as being "extendable" to a large collection of other logics given by so-called geometric theories. Hence, this system is proof-theoretically well-behaved, at least as far as the criteria of normalization and subformula property are concerned. A philosophical objection to this kind of system is that it builds-in the (desired) semantics into the given syntax, but the tradeoff is that this way one obtains a uniform framework for a large class of modal logics.
Hybrid logic
Hybrid logics are extensions of modal logics where to the usual stock of syntactic and semantic structures, we add a new kind of propositional symbols, the so-called nominals, which reference individual possible worlds, that is, a nominal is true at exactly one world. It is assumed that a set of ordinary propositional symbols and a countably infinite set of nominals are given. The sets are assumed to be disjoint. The metavariables p, q, r, . . . range over ordinary propositional symbols and a, b, c, . . . range over nominals. We also add a new kind of operators called the satisfaction operators. The formulas of hybrid modal logic are defined by the grammar
where p is an ordinary propositional symbol and a is a nominal. Formulas of the form a : C are called satisfaction statements, cf. a similar notion in [3] . In this paper we will define a system of intuitionistic hybrid logic, using the same formulas of classical hybrid logic, which will be denoted by IHL.
There are many kinds of hybrid logics in the literature, one of the parameters being which extra operators one considers. Here we restrict our attention to only satisfaction operators, a system that in the classical case has been called HL(@) where @ is one notation for satisfaction operators.
Which Constructive Hybrid Logic?
Now there are at least two different approaches that one can take when trying to put together constructivity, modality and hybridness of logic systems.
First, one might think that since hybrid logic is obtained from classical modal logic by adding nominals and satisfaction operators, one should obtain constructive hybrid logic by adding to constructive modal logic nominals and satisfaction operators. This is sensible, and will be our approach to defining IHL, but of course it depends on the constructive modal logic chosen. Our goal is to reason constructively within constructive modal logic and we want to be able to "jump" to other modal worlds using some version of constructive satisfaction operators and modalities.
Second, one might think of "hybridizing" intuitionistic logic to enhance the expressive power of intuitionistic logic, considered as a language for talking about intuitionistic Kripke structures. Choosing this option puts an excessive emphasis on Kripke semantics as a guiding principle.
It is not clear whether these two lines of research will lead to different logical systems or not. But one suspects that the results will be different. In particular, considering only constructive modal logics, one of the reasons for the multiplicity of systems is whether one believes that only the propositional basis of the logic should be constructive or whether the modalities themselves should have a constructive component of their own. This can be ascertained by asking whether adding, say the excluded middle axiom, gives you back the classical modal system you first thought of, or not. Choosing Simpson's axiom system we're choosing that the addition of the excluded middle gives you back the classical modal logic system you started from, in our case modal K. Similarly, if the natural deduction system N IHL for intuitionistic hybrid logic given later in this paper is extended with the natural deduction rule corresponding to the excluded middle (technically, we just modify the rule for ⊥ as appropriate), then will we get back the classical hybrid logic of [5] , that is, the modal operator ♦ becomes definable in terms of (♦ becomes equivalent to ¬ ¬) and we also have that ∧ and ∨ become definable in terms of → and ⊥.
Kripke Semantics
In this section we give the possible-worlds semantics for intuitionistic hybrid logic, IHL. This semantics is an extension of a possible-worlds semantics for intuitionistic modal logic which was originally introduced in a tense-logical version in the Ewald paper [8] .
The main intuition is that since we want to consider a constructive reading of hybrid logic where a distinction is made between the way of reasoning and what the reasoning is about, we need to separate the intuitionistic partial order from the interpretation of the nominals as well as the binary relation corresponding to the two modal operators.
Definition 2 A model for intuitionistic hybrid logic is a tuple
(W, ≤, {D w } w∈W , {∼ w } w∈W , {R w } w∈W , {V w } w∈W )
where (1) W is a non-empty set partially ordered by ≤; (2) for each w, D w is a non-empty set such that
w ≤ v implies D w ⊆ D v ; (3) for each w, ∼ w is an equivalence relation on D w such that w ≤ v implies ∼ w ⊆∼ v ; (4) for each w, R w is a binary relation on D w such that w ≤ v implies R w ⊆ R v ;
and (5) for each w, V w is a function that to each ordinary propositional symbol
p assigns a subset of D w such that w ≤ v implies V w (p) ⊆ V v (p).
It is assumed that if
, and dR w e, then d R w e , and similarly,
Intuitively, the elements of the set W are "states of knowledge" and for any such state w, the set D w is the set of possible worlds known in the state of knowledge w, the relation ∼ w corresponds to the known identities between possible worlds, and the relation R w is the known relationship between possible worlds. Note that the definition requires that the partial order ≤ on the states of knowledge, which we call the "epistemic" partial order, preserves knowledge, that is, if an advance to a greater state of knowledge is made, then what is known is preserved.
Given a model M and an element w of W , a w-assignment is a function that to each nominal assigns an element of D w . The relation M, g, w, d |= A is defined by induction, where w is an element of W , g is a w-assignment, d is an element of D w , and A is a formula. The interpretation of the operator involves quantification over states of knowledge whereas the interpretation of ♦ does not. This is because the modal operators correspond to quantifiers in intuitionistic first-order logic where the interpretation of the ∀ uses the accessibility relation whereas the interpretation of ∃ does not.
An example of a formula valid in classical hybrid logic but not valid in the constructive semantics given here is a : b ∨ a : ¬b, where a : b is interpreted as the possible worlds g(a) and g(b) being related by ∼ w but a : ¬b is interpreted as g(a) and g(b) not being related by ∼ v for any v ≥ w. This formula corresponds to the formula a = b ∨ ¬a = b in the first-order correspondence language we introduce below. Since in intuitionistic first-order logic we do not have a general excluded middle, a constructivist thinks that this formula should only be valid, if the equality predicate for nominals is a decidable predicate. (Incidentally, this formula would be valid if for any w, the relation ∼ w is taken to be the identity on the set D w . Thus, the relation ∼ w is needed.)
Another example is the formula a : A ↔ ¬a : ¬A. This formula should not be valid constructively, but it should be valid classically and it is actually taken as an axiom for classical hybrid logic by some authors.
The semantics satisfies the following important proposition.
PROOF. Induction in the structure of A. 2
A model for intuitionistic hybrid logic can be considered a model for intuitionistic first-order logic with equality and conversely, a model for intuitionistic first-order logic with equality can be considered a model for intuitonistic hybrid logic (see [17] for the simpler correspondence between modal-logical models and intuitionistic first-order models without equality and see also [18] which gives a definition of intuitionistic first-order models with equality). The first-order language under consideration here has a 1-place predicate symbol corresponding to each ordinary propositional symbol of modal logic, a 2-place predicate symbol corresponding to the modalities, and a 2-place predicate symbol corresponding to equality. The language does not have constant or function symbols. It is assumed that a countably infinite set of first-order variables is given. The metavariables a, b, c, . . . range over first-order variables. So the formulas of the first-order language we consider are defined by the grammar
where p is an ordinary propositional symbol of hybrid logic, and a and b are first-order variables. The connectives ¬, , and ↔ are defined as in intuitionistic hybrid logic. Moreover, if nominals of hybrid logic are identified with first-order variables, then a w-assignment in the sense of intuitionistic hybrid logic can be considered as a w-assignment in the sense of intuitionistic first-order logic and vice versa.
Given a model M = (W, ≤, {D w } w∈W , {∼ w } w∈W , {R w } w∈W , {V w } w∈W ) for intuitionistic hybrid logic, considered as a model for intuitionistic first-order logic, the relation M, w |= A[g] is defined by induction, where w is an element of W , g is a w-assignment, and A is a first-order formula.
for every element w of W and every w-assignment g. In Section 5 we shall make use of the first-order semantics above in connection with the interpretation of geometric theories.
The Natural Deduction System
In this section a natural deduction system for intuitionistic hybrid logic is given and it is shown how to extend the system with additional rules corresponding to conditions on the accessibility relations. Moreover, a normalization theorem is proved. The natural deduction system is an intuitionistic version of a natural deduction system for classical hybrid logic originally given in [5] . An axiomatic formulation for intuitionistic hybrid logic can be found in the paper [4] . See the books [13] and [19] for the basics of natural deduction. See also the book [10] for an introduction to natural deduction with a slant towards intuitionistic logic.
We make use of the following conventions. Natural deduction inference rules for intuitionistic hybrid logic are given in Figure 1 and Figure 2 . All formulas in the rules are satisfaction statements. Note that the modal rules for our system are like Simpson's modal rules, except that we replaced first-order relational formulas like R(a, c) by the hybrid formula a : 3c, thereby internalizing the accessibility relation. Note that this internalization process can be accomplished for hybrid logic, but for modal logic, these relational formulas belong the metalevel. The nominal natural deduction rules are similar to the usual equality rules for first order logic. The system thus obtained will be denoted N IHL .
A * c does not occur in a : ♦A, in C, or in any undischarged assumptions other than the specified occurrences of c : A and a : ♦c.
c does not occur in a : A or in any undischarged assumptions other than the specified occurrences of a : ♦c. 
C * None of the nominals in c occur in C or in any of the undischarged assumptions other than the specified occurrences of s jk . (Recall that nominals are identified with first-order variables and that c are the first-order variables existentially quantified over in the formula G.) 
Extensions to Geometric Theories
In what follows we shall consider natural deduction systems obtained by extending N IHL with additional inference rules corresponding to first-order conditions on the accessibility relations. The conditions we consider are expressed by so-called geometric theories. A first-order formula is geometric if it is built out of atomic formulas of the form R(a, c) and a = c using only the connectives ⊥, ∧, ∨, and ∃. In what follows, the metavariables S k and S jk range over atomic formulas of the mentioned forms. Atomic formulas of the mentioned forms can be translated into first-order hybrid logic in a truth preserving way as follows.
See [20] for an introduction to geometric logic. Now, a geometric theory is a finite set of closed first-order formulas each having the form ∀a (A → B) where the formulas A and B are geometric, a is a list a 1 , . . . , a l of first-order variables, and ∀a is an abbreviation for ∀a 1 . . . ∀a l . It can be proved, cf. [17] , that any geometric theory is intuitionistically equivalent to a basic geometric theory which is a geometric theory in which each formula has the form
where n, m ≥ 0 and n 1 , . . . , n m ≥ 1. For simplicity, we assume that the variables in the list a are pairwise distinct, that the variables in c are pairwise distinct, and that no variable occurs in both a and c. Note that a formula of the form displayed above is a Horn clause if c is empty, m = 1, and n m = 1.
We now give hybrid natural deduction rules corresponding to a basic geometric theory. The metavariables s k and s jk range over hybrid-logical formulas of the forms a : ♦c and a : c. With a first-order formula G of the form ( * ) displayed above, we associate the natural deduction inference rule (R G ) given in Figure 3 where s k is of the form HT (S k ) and s jk is of the form HT (S jk ). For example, if G is the formula
The formula, and hence the inference rule, corresponds to the accessibility relation R being antisymmetric. Now, let T be any basic geometric theory. The natural deduction system obtained by extending N IHL with the set of rules {(R G ) | G ∈ T} will be denoted N IHL + T. We shall assume that we are working with a fixed basic geometric theory T unless otherwise specified.
It is straightforward to check that if a formula in a basic geometric theory is a Horn clause, then the rule (R G ) given in Figure 3 can be replaced by the following simpler rule (which we have also called (R G )).
For example, if G is the formula corresponding to the accessibility relation being antisymmetric, cf. above, then the following rule will do.
Natural deduction rules corresponding to Horn clauses were discussed already in [14] .
An eliminable rule
Below we state a small proposition regarding an eliminable rule.
Proposition 4 The rule
a : c a : A (Nom) c : A is eliminable.
PROOF.
A straightforward extension of a proof in [5] . 2 Note in the proposition above that A can be any formula; not just a propositional symbol. Thus, the rule (Nom) generalises (Nom1) (and the rule (Nom2) as well). The side-condition on the rule (Nom1) enables us to prove a normalization theorem such that normal derivations satisfy a version of the subformula property called the quasi-subformula property. We shall return to this issue later.
Normalization
In what follows we give reduction rules for the natural deduction system and we prove a normalization theorem. First some conventions. If a premise of a rule has the form a : c or a : ♦c, then it is called a relational premise, and similarly, if the conclusion of a rule has the form a : c or a : ♦c, then it is called a relational conclusion. Moreover, if an assumption discharged by a rule has the form a : ♦c, then it is called a relationally discharged assumption. The premise of the form a : A in the rule (→ E) is called minor and the premises of the form C in the rules (∨E), (♦E), and (R G ) are called parametric premises. A premise of an elimination rule that is neither minor, relational, or parametric is called major.
A maximum formula in a derivation is a formula occurrence that is both the conclusion of an introduction rule and the major premise of an elimination rule. Maximum formulas can be removed by applying proper reductions. The rules for proper reductions are as follows. We have omitted the reduction rules involving the connectives ∧, →, :, and which can be found in [5] .
(∨I1) followed by (∨E) (analogously in the case of (∨I2))
It turns out that we need further reduction rules in connection with the inference rules (⊥E), (∨E), (♦E), and (R G ). A permutable formula in a derivation
is a formula occurrence that is both the conclusion of (⊥E), (∨E), (♦E), or (R G ) and the major premise of an elimination rule. Permutable formulas in a derivation can be removed by applying permutative reductions. The rules for permutative reductions are as follows in the case where the elimination rule has two premises. We have omitted the reduction rule where (R G ) is followed by an elimination which can be found in [5] .
(⊥E) followed by a two-premise elimination
The cases where the elimination rule has one or three premises are obtained by deleting or adding derivations as appropriate.
A derivation is normal if it contains no maximum or permutable formula. In what follows we shall prove a normalization theorem which says that any derivation can be rewritten to a normal derivation by repeated applications of reductions. To this end we need a number of definitions and lemmas.
Definition 5 The ♦-graph of a derivation π is the binary relation on the set of formula occurrences in π of the form a : ♦c which is defined as follows. A pair of formula occurrences (A, B) is an element of the ♦-graph of π if and only if it satisfies one of the following conditions. (1) A is the relational premise of an instance of (♦I) which has B as the conclusion. (2) A is the major premise of an instance of (♦E) at which B is relationally discharged. (3)
A is a parametric premise of an instance of (∨E), (♦E), or (R G ) which has B as the conclusion.
Note that the ♦-graph of π is a relation on the set of formula occurrences of π; not the set of formulas occurring in π. Also, note that every formula occurrence in a ♦-graph is of the form a : ♦c.
Lemma 6 The ♦-graph of a derivation π does not contain cycles.
PROOF. Induction on the structure of π. 2
Definition 7 The potential of a chain in the ♦-graph of π is the number of formula occurrences in the chain which are major premises of instances of (♦E).
A stubborn formula in a derivation π is a maximum or permutable formula of the form a : ♦c and the stubbornness of a stubborn formula in π is the maximal potential of a chain in the ♦-graph of π that contains the stubborn formula.
Note that the notion of potential in the definition above is well-defined since Lemma 6 implies that the number of formula occurrences of a chain in a ♦-graph is bounded. PROOF. The derivations π and π have the forms below.
Note that any formula occurrence in π except the indicated occurrences of e : d, a : ♦e, and C in an obvious way can be mapped to a formula occurrence in π. Let f be the map thus defined (note that f need not be injective as the instance of (♦E) in π might discharge more than one occurrence of a : ♦c). Using the map f , a map from the ♦-graph of π to the ♦-graph of π is defined as follows. There are a number of cases to consider. Case 1: An element (F, G) of the ♦-graph of π where the formula occurrences F and G both are in the domain of f is mapped to (f (F ), f (G)) which straightforwardly can be shown to be an element of the ♦-graph of π (observe that no assumption in π 1 or π 2 is discharged at a rule-instance in π 3 [e/c]). Case 2: An element (F, G) where G is one of the indicated occurrences of a : ♦e (and F therefore is in the domain of f ) is mapped to (f (F ), G ) where G is the relational premise of the instance of (♦I). Case 3: An element (F, G) where F is the indicated occurrence of C (and G therefore is in the domain of f ) is mapped to (F , f (G)) where F is the conclusion of the instance of (♦E). Case 4: An element (F, G) where F is one of the indicated occurrences of a : ♦e, F is different from the indicated occurrence of C, and G is in the domain of f is mapped to (F , f (G)) where F is the assumption in π 3 discharged by the instance of (♦E) corresponding to the occurrence of a : ♦e in question. Case 5: An element (F, G) where G is the indicated occurrence of C, G is different from each of the indicated occurrences of a : ♦e, and F is in the domain of f is mapped to (f (F ), G ) where G is the parametric premise of the instance of (♦I). Case 6: An element (F, G) where F is one of the indicated occurrences of a : ♦e and G is the indicated occurrence of C is mapped to (F , G ) where F is the assumption in π 3 discharged by the instance of (♦E) corresponding to the occurrence of a : ♦e in question and G is the parametric premise of the instance of (♦E). By using the map from the ♦-graph of π to the ♦-graph of π, any chain in the ♦-graph of π that does not contain any of the indicated occurrences of a : ♦e can in an obvious way be mapped to a chain in the ♦-graph of π with the same potential which does not contain the indicated occurrences of a : ♦e, a : ♦d, and a : ♦c, and similarly, any chain in the ♦-graph of π that contains one of the indicated occurrences of a : ♦e can in an obvious way be mapped to a chain in the ♦-graph of π with greater potential which contain the mentioned formula occurrences. The conclusions of the lemma follow straightforwardly. 2 Definition 9 A segment in a derivation π is a non-empty list A 1 , . . . , A n of formula occurrences in π with the following properties.
(1) A 1 is not the conclusion of an instance of (∨E), an instance of (♦E), or an instance of (R G ) with more than zero parametric premises. The following lemma is along the lines of a similar result for ordinary intuitionistic first-order logic given in [13] .
(2) For each i < n, A i is a parametric premise of an instance of (∨E), (♦E), or (R G ) which has A i+1 as the conclusion. (3) A n is not a parametric premise of an instance of (∨E), (♦E), or (R G
).
Lemma 10 Any derivation π can be rewritten to a derivation π that does not contain permutable formulas or non-stubborn maximum formulas, by repeated applications of permutative reductions applied to permutable formulas and proper reductions applied to non-stubborn maximum formulas.
PROOF. To any derivation π we assign the pair (d, k) of non-negative integers where d is the maximal degree of a permutable or non-stubborn maximum segment in π or 0 if there is no such segment and k is the sum of the lengths of permutable and non-stubborn maximum segments in π of degree d (note that a list of formula occurrences with only one element is a segment if the one and only formula occurrence in the list is a maximum formula). The proof is by induction on such pairs equipped with the lexicographic order. Let π be a derivation to which a pair (d, k) is assigned such that d > 0. It is straightforward to check that there exists a permutable or non-stubborn maximum segment σ of degree d in π such that there is i) no permutable or non-stubborn maximum segment with degree d that stands above σ and ii) no permutable or non-stubborn maximum segment with degree d that stands above or contains a minor, relational, or parametric premise of the rule instance of which the last formula occurrence in σ is the major premise. Let π be the derivation obtained by applying the appropriate reduction rule such that the last formula occurrence in σ is removed. Then it is straightforward to check that the pair (d , k ) assigned to π is less than (d, k) in the lexicographic order 2
We are now ready to prove the normalization theorem.
Theorem 11 (normalization) Any derivation can be rewritten to a normal derivation by repeated applications of proper and permutative reductions.
PROOF. By Lemma 10 we just need to consider derivations that do not contain permutable formulas or non-stubborn maximum formulas. To any such derivation π we assign the non-negative integer d where d is the maximal stubbornness of a stubborn maximum formula in π or 0 if there is no stubborn maximum formula. Let π be a derivation to which an integer d is assigned such that d > 0. It is straightforward that there exists a stubborn maximum formula A with stubbornness d such that no formula occurrence above A is a stubborn maximum formula with stubbornness d. Let π be the derivation obtained by applying the reduction such that A is removed. Then by inspecting the involved reduction rule it is trivial to check that all maximum or permutable formulas in π are stubborn, and moreover, by Lemma 8 all stubborn maximum formulas in π have stubbornness less than or equal to d and all stubborn permutable formulas in π have stubbornness less than d, and furthermore, the number of stubborn maximum formulas with stubbornness d in π is less than the number of stubborn maximum formulas with stubbornness d in π. By repeated applications of this procedure a derivation is obtained in which all maximum or permutable formulas are stubborn with stubbornness less than d. By application of Lemma 10 a derivation π is obtained that does not contain permutable formulas or non-stubborn maximum formulas. If all maximum or permutable formulas in a derivation τ are stubborn with stubbornness less than d, then it is trivial to check by inspecting the involved reduction rules that all maximum or permutable formulas in the derivation τ obtained by applying a permutative reduction are stubborn, and moreover, it can be proved in a way similar to the way in which Lemma 8 is proved, that all stubborn formulas in τ have stubbornness less than d. Thus, all maximum formulas in π are stubborn with stubbornness less than d. We are therefore done by induction. 2
The form of normal derivations
Below we adapt an important definition from [13] to intuitionistic hybrid logic. A path in a derivation π is a non-empty list A 1 , . . . , A n of formula occurrences in π with the following properties.
Definition 12

(1) A 1 is a relational conclusion, or the conclusion of a (R G ) rule with zero parametric premises, or an assumption that is not non-relationally discharged by an instance of (∨E) or (♦E). (2) For each i < n, A i is not a minor or relational premise and either (a) A i is not the major premise of an instance of (∨E) or (♦E) and A i stands immediately above A i+1 , or (b) A i is the major premise of an instance r of (∨E) or (♦E) and A i+1 is an assumption non-relationally discharged by r. (3) A n is either the end-formula of π, or a minor or relational premise, or the major premise of an instance of (∨E) or (♦E) that does not nonrelationally discharge any assumptions.
Note that A 1 in the definition above might be a discharged assumption.
Lemma 13
Any formula occurrence in a derivation π belongs to some path in π.
PROOF. Induction on the structure of π. 2
The definition of a path leads us to the lemma below. The lemma says that a path in a normal derivation can be split up into three parts: An analytical part in which formulas are broken down in their components by successive applications of the elimination rules, a minimum part in which an instance of the rule (⊥E) may occur, and a synthetical part in which formulas are put together by by successive applications of the introduction rules. See [14] .
Lemma 14
Let β = A 1 , . . . , A n be a path in a normal derivation. Then there exists a formula occurrence A i in β, called the minimum formula in β, such that (1) for each j < i, A j is a major or parametric premise or the non-relational premise of an instance of (Nom1); (2) if i = n, then A i is a non-relational premise of an introduction rule or the premise of an instance of (⊥E); and (3) for each j, where i < j < n, A j is a non-relational premise of an introduction rule, a parametric premise, or the non-relational premise of an instance of (Nom1).
PROOF. Let A i be the first formula occurrence in β which is not the nonrelational premise of an instance of (Nom1), and is not a parametric premise, and is not the major premise of an elimination rule save possibly the major premise of an instance of (∨E) or (♦E) that does not non-relationally discharge any assumptions (such a formula occurrence exists in β as A n satisfies the mentioned criteria). We are done if i = n. Otherwise A i is a non-relational premise of an introduction rule or the premise of an instance of (⊥E) (by inspection of the rules and the definition of a path). If A i is the premise of an instance of (⊥E), then each A j , where i < j < n, is a non-relational premise of an introduction rule, or the non-relational premise of an instance of (Nom1), or a parametric premise (by inspection of the rules, the definition of a branch, and normality of π). Similarly, if A i is a non-relational premise of an introduction rule, then each A j , where i < j < n, is a non-relational premise of an introduction rule or a parametric premise. 2
In what follows we shall consider the form of normal derivations. To this end we give the following definition.
Definition 15 The notion of a subformula is defined by the conventions that
• A is a subformula of A; PROOF. First a convention: The order of a path in π is the number of formula occurrences in π which stand below the last formula occurrence of the path. Now consider a path β = A 1 , . . . , A n in π of order p. By induction we can assume that the theorem holds for all formula occurrences in paths of order less than p. Note that it follows from Lemma 14 that any formula occurrence A j such that j ≤ i, where A i minimum formula in β, is a quasi-subformula of A 1 , and similarly, any A j such that j > i is a quasi-subformula of A n .
We first consider A n . We are done if A n is the end-formula A or a relational premise. If A n is the minor premise of an instance of (→ E), then we are done by induction as the major premise belongs to a path of order less than p. If A n is the major premise of an instance of (∨E) or (♦E) that does not nonrelationally discharge any assumptions, then A n is the minimum formula and hence a quasi-subformula of A 1 . Now, we are done if A 1 is a relational conclusion, or an undischarged assumption, or a relationally discharged assumption. Otherwise A 1 is discharged by an instance of (→ I) with a conclusion that belongs to some branch of order less than p (note that due to normality of π, A 1 is not the conclusion of a (R G ) rule with zero parametric premises).
We now consider A 1 . We are done if A 1 is a relational conclusion, or an undischarged assumption, or a relationally discharged assumption. If A 1 is the conclusion of a (R G ) rule with zero parametric premises, then A 1 has the same form as the minimum formula which is a quasi-subformula of A n . Otherwise A 1 is discharged by an instance of (→ I) with a conclusion that belongs to β or to some path of order less than p. 2
Note that it is a consequence of the theorem that C is a quasi-subformula of A, or of some formula in Γ, or of a formula of the form a : c or a : ♦c (since relational premises, relational conclusions, and relationally discharged assumptions are of the form a : c or a : ♦c).
Soundness and completeness
Having given the Kripke semantics and the natural deduction system, we are now ready to prove soundness and completeness. Recall that we are working with a fixed basic geometric theory T. A model M is called a T-model if and only if M |= C for every formula C in T (note that the model M in this definition is considered a first-order model as C is a first-order formula). In what follows, we shall give a Henkin-type proof of completeness. In the interest of simplicity, we shall often omit reference to the basic geometric theory T and to the natural deduction system N IHL + T. Let C be any countably infinite set of nominals and let L(C) denote the set of hybrid-logical formulas built using the nominals in C. Moreover, let C 0 denote the set of nominals in the language defined earlier in this paper, thus, L(C 0 ) denotes the language we have considered hitherto.
Definition 19 Let C and E be disjoint countably infinite sets of nominals.
A set of satisfaction statements Γ in the language L(C ∪ E) is E-saturated if and only if
if a : ♦A ∈ Γ, then for some nominal e in E, e : A ∈ Γ and a : ♦e ∈ Γ; and
We are now ready for a saturation lemma. The canonical model given below is similar to a canonical model for first-order intuitionistic logic given in [18] .
Lemma 20 (Saturation lemma) Let
. . be pairwise disjoint countably infinite sets of nominals disjoint from C 0 and let
and for each w ∈ W Γ , a w-assignment g Γ w , are defined as follows. 
Conclusions and Further Work
We have shown that constructivity and hybridness of logics are orthogonal concerns, at least to the extent that there is a logic, which we called IHL that is both hybrid and constructive. We also provided a natural deduction formulation N IHL for this logic. The system N IHL is based on Simpson's natural deduction formulation of constructive modal logic and we have shown that our hybrid version shares with it several good properties: The system is normalizing and satisfies a version of the subformula property. Hybridizing Simpson's system is not trivial, see below. Moreover, our system can be extended with inference rules corresponding to geometric first-order conditions on the accessibility relation, as can Simpson's. The possible-worlds semantics (based on Ewald's work) is sound and complete for N IHL .
In the case of ordinary first-order logic, applying a reduction to a maximum formula only generates new maximum formulas having a lower degree than the original one. In fact, the technique used in the standard normalization proof for first-order logic is based on this property. The natural deduction system given in the present paper does not have this property since the reduction rules for and ♦ might generate new maximum formulas of the form a : ♦e, that is, maximum formulas that do not necessarily have a lower degree than the original one (here we ignore permutable formulas). Thus, the standard technique used in the normalization proof does not work directly for our case. In this paper the problem is solved by using the so-called ♦-graph of a derivation which keeps track of such maximum formulas. The notion of a ♦-graph is similar to a notion introduced in [5] to solve the same kind of problem for classical hybrid logic. We have not seen such a notion elsewhere.
We reiterate that, although the proofs are reasonably straightforward, the results are important as they confirm the presupposition in hybrid logic that it is the process of hybridization that is central. Our work confirms that the process is at least to some extent independent of the basic logic considered. Thus our system provides some evidence of the naturalness of the hybridization process.
Concerning further work we would like to see whether we can adapt the "nonsituated" version of natural deduction for hybrid logics, based on Seligman's work [15, 6] , to a constructive formulation. We would also like to consider an alternative version of basic modal logic [2] as a basis for a constructive hybrid logic. Finally we need to investigate the suitability of (all?) the logics just mentioned to the problem of modelling contexts in knowledge representation formalisms devised to deal with natural language semantics.
